



THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN CASES OF INSANITY.
The subject of insanity is attracting so much attention re-
ceutly, both in its medical and legal aspects; it is so fre-
quently relied upon as a defense to criminal prosecutions, that
the mode and manner of its proof in a court of justice, the
evidence competent to be considered in ascertaining its exist-
ence, and the question by which party that evidence must be
adduced, or the burden of proof in such cases, have all become
interesting and important subjects of inquiry.
In this article we desire to call attention to the latter ques-
tion merely. On whom rests the burden of proof where in-
sanity is set up as a defense to an indictment for any crime ?
Is the burden upon the prosecution to establish the fact of
sanity, or upon the accused to make out affirmatively the fact
of insanity ? Or, to state it more clearly perhaps, is the bur-
den of proof ever on the defendant to disprove his sanity ?
The answer to that inquiry may depend upon what is meant
ny the phrase "Burden of Proof." If the accurate meaning
of that term is one established and kept steadily in view, it
will tend far to guide us to a correct conclusion. Is, then, the
burden of proof-the onus probandi-anything more or any-
thing less than the duty of proving any fact substantially in
issue? And is not that duty always upon the party who sub
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stantially asserLs the affirmative of the issues? We say sub.
stantialty asserts, not expressly merely, but also impliedly,
really, truly. The obligation of proving a fact, which though
not directly alleged on the record, is necessarily involved in the
position, proposition or issue which either party to a legal
trial assumes, lies upon such party in the same manner and
to the same degree as if he had made the allegation in the
most positive and direct terms.
With this understanding as to the meaning of the term, -s
there any doubt, can t)1ere be any doubt that as an original,
fundamental propositign, the burden of proving sanity is on the
government? As sanity-a mental competency to commit
crime-is necessarily involved in the assertionthat the accused
has committed it, as much involved as the fact of giving the
blow or using the deadly weapon, without which there is no
crime, is not the obligation to establish the element of sanity
on the same party who has the duty of proving the other facts
alleged? To illustrate by the definition of murder: "Murder,"
says Lord CocE, 3 Inst. 47, "is when a person of sound
-iemory- and discretion unlawfully killeth any reasonable crea-
ture in being, and under the King's peace, with malice afore-
thought, express or implied." Must not the fact of a sound
memory and discretion be made out affirmatively and beyond
a reasonable doubt, as well as the fact of killing or the fact
of malice ?
But it is said every man is presumed to be sane until the
contrary is proved. That is true. But does such presump-
tion change the burden of proof in the sense we have used it,
and shift upon the defendant the burden of proving that he
was not sane, so that if he fail to make out that fact affirma-
tively, he fails in his defense? The government ass rts by
the indictment of him that he was sane; he denies it, and says
"I was not sane." Here is an affirmative allegation on one
side and a direct denial on the other. A defense of insanity is
but a denial of sanity. Is the presumption of sanity anything
more than a piece of evidence-one witness testifying affirma-
tively in support of that- issue? and would the production of
one wituess to any fact which the prosecution was bound to
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prove shift upon the defendant the duty of disproving it?
This presumption may make out a prima fade case-may in
the absence of any conflicting evidence, fulfill and discharge-the
original burden; may, standing alone, justify a jury in finding
the party sane, but that is because the burdei of proof is
satisfied, not shifted upon the adverse party. This was the real
point involved in Commonwealth v. Eddy, 7 Gray 583. If the
language used in that case seems to impose on the prisoner
any greater duty than that of offering sufficient evidence of
insanity to rebut and outweigh the presumption of sanity, and
thus create a reasonable doubt of his sanity, it does not appear
to us consistent with the doctrines of Commonwealth v. McKie,
1 Gray 61.
Even in civil cases the existence of a presumption in favor of
the plaintiff, or even the introduction of actual testimony es-
tablishing a prima facie case, does not shift the burden to the
defendant of establishing a contrary proposition. The bur-
den steadily remains throughout the entire case upon that
party to whom it belongs in the outset. Producing much or
little evidence in support of a given proposition or assertion
cannot change the duty of proving it. Making out a prima
facie case may call upon the defendant to offer some evidence to
contradictthe plaintiff's case; and the duty of producing coun-
tervailing evidence may thus devolve upon the defendant.
But the duty of denying an assertion is not the same as the duty
of affirmatively proving its opposite. Between these two ter-
mini there is a wide range of evidence which applies or may
apply to a denial of the plaintiff's proposition, and looks solely
to that end, without seeking to establish an affirmative propo-
sition in opposition thereto. However forcible or however con-
vincing may be the plaintiff's testimony, however completely
the original burden of proof resting on him may be carried
and sustained, it is not thereby shifted upon him who denies
the affirmative of the issue. That this is so in civil cases is
abundantly clear: see Powers v. Russell, 13 Pick. 69, decided
by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1832, and certainly
the great leading case on this subject. See, also, Tourtellot v.
Rosebrook, 11 Met. 460 ; Ross v. Gerrish, 8 Allen 147 ; Cen-
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tral Brid;e Corporation v. Butler, 2 Gray 132; Morri~on v.
Clark, 7 Gush. 213; Bradford v. Stevens, 10 Gray 379; 1)e-
lano v. Bartlett, 6 Cush. 364; Gay v. Bates, 99 Mass. 263.
This rule prevails alike in actions sounding in tort and in
suits or contracts. So when in a civil proceeding the question
of sanity and insanity is directly an issue, although the pre-
sumption of sanity exists with at least as much force as in crimi-
nal prosecutions, still the burden of proving sanity always re-
mains throughout the entire trial with that party who asserts
it. An executor offering a will for probate impliedly asserts the
sanity of his testator, his competency to execute a will. The
presumption of sanity is with him, but the burden of affirma-
tively proving insanity is not thereby cast upon the opponents
of the will. This is fully maintained in the excellent judgment
of THomAs, J., in Crowninshield v. Crouminshield, 2 Gray 624,
which has been frequently approved and followed in other
American cases: Baxter v. Abbott, 7 Gray 83. See, also, Rigg
v. Wilton, 13 Illinois 15; kforrison v. Smith, 3 Bradford 209;
Cramer v. Crambaugh, 3 Maryland 491; Cilley v. Cilley 34
Maine 162; Baldwin v. Parker, 99 Mass. 84; that the bur-
den of proving sanity is on the executor. Such is also the
English rule: Barry v. Butlin, 1 Curties, Ecc. R., 640; 2
Moore, P. 0., 480; Browning v. Budd, 6 Id. 430; Harwood v.
Baker, 3 Id. 282; Sutton v. Sadler, 3 C. B. (N. S.), 87, in
which CREsswELL, J., says, "whether the party propounding a
will relies upon a prima facie case, or gives the whole of his
proofs in the first instance, the onus remains on him through-
out." In Perkins v. Perkins, 39 New Hampshire 171, BELL,
0. J., says, after reviewing the authorities: "It is, therefore,
proper to say that the burden of proving the sanity of the
testator, and all the other requirements of the law to make a
valid will, is upon the party who asserts its validity. This
burden remains upon him till the close of the trial, though he
need introduce no proof upon this point until something ap-
pears to the contrary."
If, therefore, in civil cases the burden of proving sanity is
on the party who asserts it, a fortiori, it is so in criminal
prosecutions. There the plea of "not guilty" denies and puts
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to issue every material allegation and fact on which the prose-
cution rests; every fact as much as every express allegation.
The mental competency to. be guilty is necessarily involved in
the denial of guilt. Insanity is not a fact in avoidance of
guilt, but sanity is a condition precedent to guilt itself. It
underlies and forms a part of the very charge, is one of the
most essential ingredients in it. Were it an independent, sub-
stantive fact not necessarily embraced and included in the
accusation, the burden of proof would very properly rest on
the accused, and in analogy with the rule for which we are
contending, would not shift upon the prosecution, even after
he had offered primafacie evidence of such fact. Thus, sup-
pose the defense to be a prior acquittal of the same offense;
there the burden of proving that the former charge was for
the same identical crime is on the prisoner, and does not
change upon the introduction of sufficient prima facie evidence
of such identity; it remains with him still. This is illustrated,
if any authority is needed, by Commonwealth v. Daley, 4 Gray
209, in which Judge BIGELOW apples the same rule to the pris-
oner as had been imposed on the government in Common-
wealth v. Me.Kie, 1 Gray 61. But the fact of sanity is no
such separate, independent, disconnected fact or proposition,
but is as much a necessary part of the first step in the guilt
of the accused as his own boalily presence at the time and
place where the offense was committed. But suppose the
defense was an alibi; is the burden on the defendant to make
that out affirmatively to the satisfaction of the jury? Would
the offense be proved upon him if the jury, upon all the evi-
dence offered on both sides (or even if he offer none), have rea-
sonable doubts of the alibi? or, in other words, reasonable
doubt of his presence? We speak, of course, of those offenses
where bodily presence is necessary. That the burden of proof
is not changed where an alibi is set up, but that the prisoner
is entitled to an acquittal, if there be a reasonable doubt
whether he was at the place and at the time when and where the
offense was committed: see Hopps v. The People, 31 Illinois
393; Miller v. The People, 39 Id. 465; Fife v. The Common
wealth, 29 Penn. St. R. 439; State v. Cameron, 40 Verm.
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556. But is 'not mental presence, a sound, healthy mental
presence, as necessary to be proved beyond a doubt by the
government as mere presence of body? And if a reasonable
doubt of the latter entitles the accused to an acquittal, shall
such doubt of the former have less effect?
Again. Suppose the defense to a charge for assault and bat-
tery or a homicide, be that the blow was accidental, or given in
self-defense, is the burden of proving that fact affirmatively on
the prisoner? Can the jury find him guilty if they have rea-
sonable doubts upon that question? The convincing reasoning
of Mr. Justice BIGELOW in Commonwealth v. 2cKie, 1 Gray
61, furnishes a sufficient answer to that question. See also
United States v. He Clare, 7 Boston Law Reporter (N. S.) 439,
December, 1854; United States v. Lunt, 1 Sprague's Dec. 311.
But is not the general competency of the accused to be guilty
as much involved in the charge itself as the particular mental
intention or design at the exact moment the blow was inflicted?
Is it not as much a necessary ingredient of the very offense,
and should not the same rules apply? We are not arguing as
to the weight to be given to the presumption of sanity, nor
that the prosecution are bound to offer any other evidence of
sanity in the first instance. It is clear they are not-Com-
monwealth v. Eddy, 7 Gray 583-but the question is: Does
the existence of such presumption cast the burden of disprov-
ing sanity on the prisoner? Is it so in other cases? Does a
presumption of guilt, arising from certain facts, cast on him the
burden of proving his innocence? The possession of stolen
property recently after theft raises the presumption that the
possessor committed the larceny; a presumption which, in the
absende of any explanatory testimony, is prima faie proof of
his guilt, proof sufficient to warrant a jury in finding that fact;
but does it shift the burden of proof on him to establish
affirmatively that he was not guilty? If, notwithstanding the
presumption, the prima facie evidence arising from the pos.
session, the jury are in reasonable doubt as to his guilt, should
they convict him? A different rule was laid down by the
Supreme Court of Maine, in The State v. kferrick, 19 Maine
R. 398, decided in 1841. The court below instructed the jury
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that the fact of possession raised a legal presumption that the
defendant stole the goods, and "that after such legal presump-
tion of guilt had been raised, the burden of proof was upon the
defendant to repel that presumption," and he was convicted.
But the full court reversed this decision, and set aside the ver-
dict, declaring that although "possession by the accused soon
after the goods were stolen raised a reasonable presumption of
his guilt sufficient to make out a primafacie case on the part
of the government, proper to be left to the jury, yet, if, by the
opposing testimony, a reasonable doubt was thrown upon a
prima facie case of guilt, it can no longer be said that the ac-
cused is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." So in
The State v. Fly , 26 Maine 312, it was expressly held that
although a primafacie case is made out against the accused,
the burden of proof is not thereby changed, but still remains
on the prosecution throughout the whole case. See, also, Tar-
box v. Eastern Steamboat Co., 50 Maine 345; Ogletree v. he
State, 28 Alabama 702; Commonwealth v. Kimball, 24 Pick.
366, had laid down the same rule in Massachusetts as early as
1837. A prima facie case or prima facie evidence may lift the
burden of proof; it does not shift it.
But how stand the authorities upon this exact question of
sanity or insanity? Many judges are reported as saying that
because a person is presumed sane, therefore the burden of
proof is shifted upon him to prove his insanity, and even to
make it out beyondall reasonable doubt. Thus in The State v.
Spencer, 1 Zabriskie (N. J.), Chief Justice HORNBLOWER said.
"The proof of insanity ought to be as clear and satisfactory,
in order to acquit on the ground of insanity as the proof of
committing the act ought to be, in order to find a sane man
guilty." In The State v. Brinyea, 5 Alabama 241, it was held
that the "prisoner was bound to make out by the testimony,
beyond all reasonable doubt, that he was insane at the time the
act was committed, by proof strong, clear and convincing."
Similar phrases may be found in The People v. ffyers, 20 Cali-
fornia 518; State v. Hunting, 21 Missouri 477 ; Loeffner v. The
State, 10 Ohio St. R. 598; Fisher v. The People, 23 Illi-
nois 283; Graham v. The Commonwealth, 16 B. Monroe
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586; Bonf anti v. The State, 2 Minnesota 123; State v. Star.
ling, 6 Jones (N. 0.) 366; The People v. McCann, 3 Parker,
C. C" 272; State v. Stark, 1 Strobhart 479 ; Regina v. Stokes,
3 0. and K. 188 ; Regina v. Higginson, 1 C. and K. 130; Re-
gina v. Layton, 4 Cox, C. C., 149 ; Regina v. Taylor, Id. 155;
Regina v. Turton, 6 Id. 385; State v. McCoy, 34 Missouri
531; State v. Klinger, 43 Id. 127, as late as 1868, steadily ad-
hering to the doctrine.
Doubtless, in one sense of the word, some burden is on the
defendant; that is, the burden of offering the first testimony on
the question of sanity or insanity; for the general presumption
of sanity is sufficient for the government to rest upon in the
outset. They are not bound to produce any other evidence,
and if there was nothing to shake this presumption, the jury
might presume the fact ; and as the defendant is bound to offer
the first evidence, the burden of proof, in a rather loose sense
of that term, might be said to be on him. And had this been
all the error committed, it would not have been so important.
But the danger of using such an erroneous form of expression
is well illustrated, by many of the foregoing cases, which have
thereby beenled into the deeper errorof compelling the accused
to prove his insanity affirmatively and beyond all reasonable
doubt. Perhaps many of these cases mean to hold merely that.
the presumption of sanity is sufficient until some counter evi.
dence is offered and sustains and satisfies the burden of proof,
and do not intend to lay down the rule that the burden of
proving insanity, in the sense we have used the term in this
article, is shifted to the defendant; if so, they are consistent
and reasonable. But if they go further, and positively declare,
as the language in some of them implies, that the burden of
proof is so far on the defendant that although he raises by his
evidence a reasonable doubt of his sanity, but does not quite
clearly prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, he is not entitled
to an acquittal2 it is respectfully submitted they are unjust,
unreasonable and not supported by the analogies of the law.
The first advance from this extreme doctrine seems to have
been made in Commonwealth v. Rogers, 7 Met. 500, by the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in which the jury, after
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being in consultation several hours, came into court with this
delicate, but all-important question: "Must the jury be satis.
fled beyond a doubt of the insanity of the prisoner to entitle
him to an acquittal ?" Chief Justice SHAw, apparently recoil-
ing from the extreme and harsh rule laid down in some cases
before cited, replied that "if the preponderance of the evidence
was in favor of the insanity of the prisoner, the jury would be
authorized to find him insane." And he was found "not
guilty, by reason of insanity." This was in 1844. In 1856
the leading criminal cases were published, in which Mr. Ben-
nett, in a note to Rogers' case and ffctie's case, argued that
the rule was still more favorable to the accused in such cases,
and if the jury had a reasonable doubt of his sanity, they
were bound to acquit. This reasoning was cited and relied
upon in a very able case in New Hampshire, in 1861, State v.
Bartlett, 43 N. H. R., where an interesting opinion was given
by BELLOWS, J.
This subject was carefully considered by the New York
Court of Appeals in 17te People v. McCann, 16 New York
58, for the murder of his wife. The judge below, before whom
he was tried (see 3 Parker, C. 0. 272), had instructed the jury
as follows : "The fact of killing is admitted; that the act was
done by the prisoner is not disputed; thus the issue is really
reversed from the nsual one. The question of insanity is
matter of positive defense, and it is a defense to be affirma-
tively proved; a failure to prove it is like the failure to prove
any other fact, the misfortune of the party attempting to make
the proof. The act being plainly committed, and that the pri-
soner did it being undoubted, and the defense set up on his
part that he was insane, the burden of proof is shifted; as
sanity is the natural state, there is no presumption of insanity,
and the defense must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
But this charge was held erroneous, and a new trial ordered,
and BRowN, J., very clearly and forcibly states the true rule of
law in such cases. In the trial of Gen. Sickles, in the District
Court at Washington, for the murder of Philip Barton Key,
Judge CRAWFORD ruled after elaborate arguments that the bur-
den of proving sanity was throughout on the government, and
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